Elena Koneva
Russia.Post article, October 18, 2024
Based on data from a multi-stage study, sociologist Elena Koneva traces the evolution of attitudes toward the war from Russia’s invasion in February 2022 through Ukraine’s raid into Kursk Region in August 2024.
The Russia-Ukraine war has turned into a prolonged calamity from which there seems to be no escape and no chance to effect its end. Last year was marked by a routinization and marginalization of the war. Awareness of the fighting in Ukraine was psychologically suppressed.
This occurred for two reasons: one, people felt afraid and helpless, and, two, the war was happening “at a distance.” Everyday life stabilized, allowing people to not think or talk about the war all the time.
A new phase in attitudes toward the war
The emergence of antiwar presidential candidates Ekaterina Duntsova and Boris Nadezhdin (see Russia.Post about them here) in the spring of 2024 provided the shot in the arm needed to reenergize antiwar sentiment. Thanks in particular to the active process of collecting and giving signatures in support of Nadezhdin, the idea of peace was legitimized in the public discourse for some time.
Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we have been constantly asking respondents the same question: “do you support or do you not support Russia’s military operation in Ukraine, if you can say unequivocally?”
In February 2024, support for the war in our surveys fell from 55-56% to a record low of 46%, while readiness for a withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine, on the contrary, rose to a record high of 49%. (Unless otherwise specified, the data mentioned was obtained by the Chronicles project and the ExtremeScan research group).
In our view, it was from this moment that a significant portion of the country recovered its senses, with a more conscious perception of the war taking hold.
Everyday life, consisting of worries about food, the health of loved ones and raising children, along with safeguarding one’s property and home, has gradually sapped people’s willingness to endure war and eroded their loyalty to the authorities.
Throughout the war, almost all researchers have noted that low-income Russians are less supportive of the special military operation than those with higher incomes. In September, Chronicle data put their support at 41% and 56%, respectively.
The dynamics of people’s personal financial situation is an important indicator, as it is such subjective assessments that drive attitudes toward the government and the war.
In our polls at the beginning of 2023, 15% of respondents reported a deterioration in their financial situation; by September 2024, this figure had reached 27%. Support for the war among respondents who have suffered materially is always significantly lower than among those who saw no such change (43% versus 49%).
Last month, 75% of respondents said that they or their family members had had to take out loans. In 2022-23, respondents who took out a loan because the “opportunity arose to improve their housing situation” demonstrated more support for the war (56%). Those whose relatives had fought in Ukraine were twice as likely to mention such an opportunity. Among Russians who needed money “urgently to get by,” support for the special military operation was, on the contrary, below average (45%).
“People’s attitudes toward the war heavily depend on their personal financial situation, a connection that becomes especially evident when we look at repaying loans.”
In response to the question “in 2023 and 2024, has it become easier or harder for you or your family to repay loans than before, or has the situation remained the same?” 6% of respondents said that it had become easier and 52% said harder. The former were generally more likely to support the war (63% versus 49% for the entire sample), while only 30% of the latter approved of the special military operation.
Mobilization affecting increasing number of Russians
As the number of families with men who are fighting or fought in Ukraine has grown, perceptions of the war has changed.
When asked whether they have such relatives, 20% answered in the affirmative a year and a half ago, while in August-September 2024 the figure was up to 30%.
For context, a similar survey question was asked in Ukraine in March 2024: 70% said they had “loved ones” (blizkiye, not “relatives,” rodstvenniki) who fought or are fighting to defend the country. Meanwhile, in Russia’s so-called “national republics” like Buryatia, Tyva, Dagestan and Chechnya, where mobilization is suspected to have taken a bigger toll, 43% to 54% say there are Ukraine war veterans in their family.
On average, 26% of Russian respondents thought that more people had been taken for the war from their region than from others, but in Moscow, St Petersburg and Sverdlovsk Region (Yekaterinburg), only 6-8% of respondents said so. In the abovementioned national republics, this figure ranges from 32% to 51%.
At this point, among Russians who have family members who are fighting or fought in Ukraine, support for the war is higher. This is hardly surprising: one would expect them to have trouble coming to terms with the notion that their relatives have been thrown into an unjustified war.
Understandably, these respondents are also more concerned about the dead and wounded in Ukraine than their countrymen without Ukraine war veterans in their family (89% versus 79%). As the losses mount, the cost of the war will inevitably come into focus.
Crocus City Hall and support for the war
Support for war, like support for ending hostilities, rises and falls with dramatic events, only to eventually return to previous levels. A striking example is the reaction to the March 2024 terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall in Moscow.
Propaganda successfully shaped the attitude toward the tragedy that the authorities wanted: 37% of Russians said the West and NATO had ordered the attack, while 27% fingered Ukraine and only 9% radical Islamists. Propaganda convinced some portion of the country that with Ukraine and its partners waging war so barbarically, Russia needed to unite even more and refuse peace talks.
However, the terrorist attack, like other dramatic events, soon faded in people’s memories.
In April, following Crocus City Hall and during a period when the Russian army was on the advance in Ukraine, support for the special military operation, as measured by ExtremeScan telephone surveys, soared to 61% from an average of 53% during the presidential election. Yet by mid-June, a Russian Public Opinion and Attitudes (PROPA) telephone survey had recorded a return to the February-March figure of 53%.
The Kursk raid triggers awakening about the war
Despite the proximity of the front line – for parts of Kursk Region, enemy soldiers were sometimes only 30 kilometers away – the war for Kursk residents remained a television phenomenon. Indeed, they themselves have said the war for them began on August 6, 2024, with the Ukrainian army’s incursion into the region.
Unlike shelling and other war-related events along the border, which led to an increased sense of national unity, the Ukrainian raid had the opposite effect: support for the war began to decline and anxiety increased. A similar dynamic was observed during mobilization in September 2022 and in response to the stiffening of Russia’s conscription law in April 2023.
According to OpenMinds, which studies traditional and social media narratives, in the first week after the raid into Kursk Region, sentiment shifted: on a scale where minus 1.00 is the most negative attitude toward the special military operation and plus 1.00 is the most positive, it went from minus 0.25 to minus 0.47.
“Russians and especially Kursk Region residents were disappointed by the undefended national borders, the weakness of the army and the unwillingness of the state to protect its citizens and even help them to evacuate.”
Most local officials fled, leaving people to their fate. In the initial period, only volunteers were there to help refugees who managed to reach safe Russian territory.
We asked: “if Vladimir Putin decides to withdraw Russian troops from the territory of Ukraine and begins negotiations for a ceasefire, without having achieved the initially stated goals of the special military operation, will you support or not support such a decision?”
Against the backdrop of the Kursk raid, the share of those ready to support a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine and peace talks on these terms has grown from 40% to 49%, returning to the peak level of antiwar sentiment that was observed during Boris Nadezhdin’s presidential campaign.
The share of those against such a shift in Russian policy remained at 33%, despite the Kursk incursion. Note that within this 33%, there are at least two groups with different motives: about half are staunch supporters of prosecuting the war until victory, i.e., until “the set goals of the special operation,” which the respondents, nevertheless, understand vaguely, are achieved; others are driven by fear of further Ukrainian advances and payback.
To such fear we can probably attribute the spike in popularity for keeping the war going (to 44%) after the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack, which, thanks to propaganda, was perceived as a continuation of the war by terrorist means.
No matter how the Ukrainian raid into Kursk Region plays out, the fact that the Russian border was violated, with the enemy occupying Russian territory, has convinced many Russians that the country’s army is weak.
One factor explaining support for the war is the perception of the military’s success, even if that is the result of propaganda.
Conversely, the failure of the Russian army in Kursk is a powerful factor reducing the popularity of the war, comparable to mobilization.
The recent advance of the Russian army in the Donbas has not prevented awareness of the Kursk failure from spreading. Firstly, enemy troops remain in Kursk Region. Secondly, the Donbas offensive is not as important to Russians.
“When asked to choose between liberating Kursk Region or advancing deeper into Ukrainian territory, 53% say they want to take Russian land back and only 15% care more about victories beyond Russia’s borders.”
There is a consensus on this issue in Russian society: the views of Ukraine war hawks and doves do not differ.
In many ways, the value of occupied Ukrainian territory is completely different for ordinary people than for the Kremlin. Were the former to choose what to insist on in Russia-Ukraine peace talks, only 26% would try to hold on to occupied territory, versus 46% who would make peace conditional on a refusal by Kyiv to join NATO.
The Kursk raid as a harbinger of mobilization
Less than a month after the Kursk raid, support for the idea that amid a budget deficit, the state should prioritize spending on the armed forces over the social sphere increased from 37 to 43%; before that, this figure had only gone down.
This appears to be driven not only by rising revanchist sentiments and the need to liberate Kursk Region, but also by a feeling of insecurity and anxiety amid the threat of mobilization, since the Ukrainian incursion demonstrated the weakness of the army and a shortage of Russian manpower.
According to OpenMinds, after the raid into Kursk Region, there was a jump in search queries related to mobilization.
The state pays contract soldiers generously, but the number of men ready to fight obviously does not correspond to the army’s needs. In these conditions, Russians support higher fiscal spending on the military, even at the expense of social services, so Russian territory can be liberated and another round of mass compulsory mobilization can be avoided.
At the same time, 22% of Russians think that mobilization is needed in the coming year, with even 11% of staunch doves agreeing with this. Twice as many, 42%, are sure that mobilization is an inevitability, despite official assurances to the contrary.
The concern about mobilization is reflected in related fears and anxieties: for example, the threat of being wounded or killed in Ukraine is seen as the number one problem by 78% of respondents in Russia, according to ExtremeScan data.
This figure has reached 90% in Belgorod Region – which is not just geographically close to the front line but has also suffered civilian casualties because of shelling and drone attacks – and 88-90% in the mobilization focal points of Dagestan, Bashkortostan, Tyva and Buryatia.
If continuing the special military operation means new mobilization, 49% (versus 36%) would prefer to end the war and bring Russian soldiers home. Another sign of the growing rejection of mobilization is changing attitudes toward draft dodgers: 27% now condemn them, while 51% understand them (the rest unable to determine their position). A year and a half ago, the ratio was 36% to 46%.
Respondents believe that volunteer (contract) soldiers are motivated mainly by financial interests (37%), a sense of duty (24%) or a combination of both (29%).
“Unsurprisingly, those who support the war are more likely to attribute a noble motive to volunteers (32%), while acknowledging that money plays an important role (23%).”
Open opponents of the war are extremely skeptical about the notion of contract soldiers going to war out of a sense of duty: 80% believe that they are in it for the money.
No longer someone else’s war
According to the Levada Center, over nearly a year and a half, the share of Russians who believe that the special military operation has done more harm than good has grown, reaching 47% (up six percentage points since May 2023). Simultaneously, the number who say that the war has been a net positive has slid, hitting 28% (down 10 percentage points).
This echoes the responses to our question “what good will Russia’s victory bring you individually?” A whopping 56% said none. Among those 30% who provided specific benefits, they most often said things along the lines of: the bloodshed will stop; those who have left will come back; relatives and loved ones at war will come home; relations with relatives in Ukraine will go back to normal.
Less often these people mention national pride, Russia’s superpower status, respect for Russia or economic benefits. That is, they are thrown off by the question of personal benefit, which most often turns out to be a return to the prewar norm, as if the war had never happened.
At the individual level, the desire for peace overshadows the goals formulated by propagandists. Sixty-three percent are willing to conclude a peace treaty with Ukraine featuring mutual concessions; moreover, 49% are ready for peace without “achieving the set goals of the special operation” (regardless of how they understand these goals).
When faced with a choice between mobilization and peace, between advancing in the Donbas and liberating Kursk Region, the majority of respondents want peace and to reverse the Ukrainian incursion.
The growing readiness for peace and compromises in Russian society testifies to an increasing awareness of the tragic consequences of this war.
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