Published on Russia.Post on March 4, 2025
Sociologist Elena Koneva examines the impact of the “Trump factor” on Russian public opinion. Though Russians are now inclined to reject compromises to Ukraine, she notes that the more talk of negotiations and peace there is, the harder it will be to reverse this paradigm if and when the peace process fails.
Over the three years since the war began, the ExtremeScan and Chronicles research teams have conducted 30 waves of surveys. Some questions have been asked in almost every survey, allowing us to track how perceptions of the special military operation have evolved.
Two main questions help us to understand Russians’ attitude to a hypothetical decision by Vladimir Putin to pull troops out of Ukraine and begin peace negotiations even if the goals of the special operations had not been achieved.
Support for the special operation
Question: “do you support or do you not support Russia’s military operation on the territory of Ukraine? Do you find it hard to answer this question unequivocally or do you not want to answer this question?”
Support for the special military operation has been stable at times, rising or falling depending on the situation, but nevertheless the trend has been a steady decline.
In June 2022, the fall in support was driven by the realization that the conflict was dragging on. In September 2022, it dipped again after “partial mobilization” was announced. Other factors include the Ukrainian counteroffensive in autumn 2023 , the antiwar rhetoric of Boris Nadezhdin during the presidential campaign in early 2024 and the Ukrainian army’s raid into Kursk Region in August 2024.
Over the last six months, support for the special military operation has stabilized at 50-52%. As our analysis of all 30 waves shows, blips are possible (as, for example, after the terrorist attack at Moscow’s Crocus City Hall), but the figures always return to the corridor of averages for the preceding few months.
Support for pulling troops out of Ukraine, starting peace talks
Question: “If Vladimir Putin were to decide to withdraw Russian troops from the territory of Ukraine and begins negotiations on a ceasefire without having achieved the initial goals of the military operation, would you support or would you not support that decision?"
This data should be treated with caution, as it includes four parameters (discussed below), including the loaded “without having achieved the initial goals of the military operation.” Over the last year, from February 2024, responses were split like this: 47-49% would support a push for peace and 30-33% would not. The “dovish” result was reinforced by the Ukrainian army’s incursion into Kursk Region, which showed that fighting could take place on Russian territory as well.
The February 2025 wave, however, showed an unexpected shift: 41% would support a push for peace and 46% would not. The share of “hawkish” responses grew 50%.
In our view, this may be explained by two important circumstances in which the survey was carried out. The first is Trump’s rhetoric about an end to the war. The second is state media coverage of battlefield successes by the Russian army.
The Trump factor
Trump’s rhetoric sounds less like a proposal for a compromise between the warring sides and more like a vision for a Russia-friendly peace, supporting Russians’ hopes for what they might see as a victory for Russia.
“Though no one yet knows how the Trump factor will influence potential peace talks and the outcome of the special military operation, it has already had a tangible impact on Russian public opinion.”
Trump’s emergence on the scene as Russia’s supporter has allowed Russians to dig in their heels on concessions that they had previously thought inevitable.
In September 2024, i.e., even before the US presidential election, among the events that respondents said they would like to see happen in the coming year, 63% mentioned “a peace treaty with Ukraine with mutual concessions.” Now, however, a large portion of Russians perceive negotiations with Trump as a chance for a victory without any concessions. Seemingly, this is behind the 16 pp rise in the share of respondents who are unwilling to support a hypothetical move to pull out troops from Ukraine and begin peace talks. Trump’s stance, they think, means Russia might be able to end the war on its terms, achieving its initial goals – why, then, would Russia stop?
Further confirmation of the impact of the Trump factor is seen in responses to the question of whom concluding a peace depends on. There were five leaders on the list (multiple answers where possible): Putin, Zelensky, Trump, Xi and Macron. It should come as no surprise that Zelensky, the president of a country at war with Russia – especially in the context of Trump’s willingness to negotiate behind his back – only received 18% of the responses. Macron is viewed as even less influential, with a puny 8%. Putin, of course, leads with 94%, followed by Trump with 78% and Xi with 41%. Putin constantly talks about his desire for peace, placing responsibility for “sabotaging” the peace process on the Ukrainian side. Because of this, 80% of respondents believe he is pursuing peace and only 10% say he seeks to continue the special operation.
After Trump’s loud statements about his intention to end the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, hopes for a quick end to the war strengthened. The share of those who rated Trump’s influence as high rose from 53% to 78% within two weeks in February (the share saying the same about Putin rose from 88% to 94% in the same time frame).
Hopes for a quick peace have grown proportionately with assessments of Trump’s influence. For a long time, from February 2023, only 21% believed that peace could be expected within “several months.” Yet this figure jumped to 30% at the beginning of last month and then to 43% just two weeks later.
Recent successes of the Russian army
The second circumstance driving the decline in Russians’ readiness to start peace talks has been advances by Russian troops over the past few months. Their (small) scale is of little importance to respondents – what is important is that they took place and that they were covered by the Russian media.
“According to an ExtremeScan study of attitudes toward a peace with Ukraine (February 2025), about 70% of Russians believe that the situation on the battlefield is favorable for the Russian army.”
In this context, pulling troops out of Ukraine looks unjustified. Moreover, since we are talking about a possible redrawing of maps along the contact line when a peace agreement is signed, people reason that more Ukrainian territory ought to be taken.
This motivation, however, is decoupled from Russians’ willingness to spend money on such a blitzkrieg. Back in September 2024, when asked what the federal budget should prioritize, 43% said defense and 38% said social policy; in February 2025, the ratio had flipped to 36% versus 48%, respectively – a 10 pp jump for the latter.
In fairness, the autumn result came against the backdrop of the Ukrainian army’s foray into Kursk Region. The threat of mobilization rallied sentiment and might have boosted support for more military spending to recruit and pay contract soldiers as an alternative to a new draft.
Now, Russians’ fiscal preferences have gone back to where they were in early 2024. Meanwhile, a significant portion of respondents say their personal financial situation has deteriorated (36% in February 2025, up from 21% in January 2024). The figure for those whose financial situation has improved has not budged, at 16% and 17%, respectively. Overall, defense spending is becoming less popular, which nevertheless has not dampened Russians’ willingness to fight on.
Changing scenarios for peace
The desire for peace, according to all pollsters, has been steadily rising. In this sense, the abovementioned jump in the share of those who said they would not support a “withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Ukraine and begins negotiations on a ceasefire without having achieved the initial goals of the military operation” (46% in February 2025) does not in fact mean an increase in militarism, revanchism or support for the war.
In interpreting the responses to this question, we should take into account the active coverage of Russian advances on the ground by state media, as well as Trump’s rhetoric seemingly in support of Russia’s negotiating position. The researchers are now contemplating revising the wording of the question, which has served as an important indicator of public sentiment regarding Ukraine conflict for almost three years. The reason is that some of the question’s parameters that influence responses – Putin’s decisions, withdrawal of troops, start of peace talks, unachieved goals – no longer seem relevant.
Let’s analyze these parameters.
1. Most paternalistically minded Russians are still ready to accept (any) decisions of Putin.
2. The question of pulling Russian troops out of Ukraine is practically closed. It is obvious that the occupied regions will not be returned to Ukraine; this is constantly being voiced publicly both by the White House and by the Russian media.
3. Peace talks are welcome, and there is hope that they have commenced.
4. The issue of unachieved goals, in the context of US-Russia negotiations, has become ambivalent. After three years of war, there is no clarity as to what exactly these goals are, since they have been formulated differently at different stages of the conflict.
“When asked to choose between liberating Kursk Region or advancing deeper into Ukrainian territory, 53% say they want to take Russian land back and only 15% care more about victories beyond Russia’s borders.”
For example, a formal promise by Kyiv not to join NATO can be considered an achieved goal. And, to judge by the news flow around US-Russia negotiations, this is probably not the only achievement that Russia will be able to declare.
It will not even be necessary to choose between security and territory, as our question put it: in September 2024, when asked, “what do you think Russia should prioritize in peace negotiations – keeping new territory or getting a Ukrainian promise not to join NATO?” 46% said the latter (choosing security) and 26% the former; in February 2025, only 22% of Russians said Russia should give up some Ukrainian territory in exchange for a quick peace and border security, versus 66% who were not ready to trade away Russian gains, even if that means the war drags on and new mobilization is required.
Hope for a victory without concessions
The rise in the share of Russians who would choose a continuation of the war over a peace with compromises, alongside the rise in the share those who are unwilling to spend more on defense, indicates that the majority of the country expects a quick peace on favorable terms.
“People believe a peace agreement reflecting Russia’s military superiority is about to be signed – exactly the one they have been waiting for.”
With a favorable peace seeming so close, withdrawing troops before achieving Russia’s initial goals looks like a missed opportunity, naturally provoking disagreement among some respondents. Meanwhile, they see no point in continuing to pay to bring about victory if it will soon be served up “for free” by Trump, especially amid people’s worsening personal financial situations.
Russian society has gone through various phases in terms of its attitude toward the special military operation. The long phase in which the war was gradually fading into the background – with the presidential election in March 2024 and the dovish rhetoric of Nadezhdin, as well as the murder of Alexei Navalny – was replaced by a phase of the war gradually coming back into focus. The Kursk incursion, along with the rising costs of the war, catalyzed this shift. However, Trump promised to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict during his presidential campaign, and after he won, the topic of peace came to the fore. Given his seeming intention to end the war quickly, another phase in Russians’ attitude toward the Ukraine conflict has started, where they expect an imminent and relatively easy victory.
The more they talk of negotiations and peace on the air, in kitchens and on the front lines, the more difficult it will be to reverse this perception when the peace process eventually breaks down, as seems to be the most likely outcome. Fighting on, which may require new mobilization, would not come without consequences for the public perception of a special military operation that has long since turned into a war.
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