Elena Koneva's article published onThe Russia Program website
January 31, 2025
Executive Summary
An extended analysis of Vladimir Putin's approval ratings highlights the complex dynamics behind the apparent public support for the Russian president. A key challenge in analyzing support for Vladimir Putin is indeed the superficiality of traditional approval metrics. While traditional polls from FOM, VTsIOM, and Levada Center suggest stable support, the research conducted by ExtremeScan and related qualitative studies reveal a more nuanced reality. Putin's high approval ratings do not necessarily reflect genuine loyalty or agreement with his policies. Instead, they result from political apathy, symbolic allegiance, and the lack of viable alternatives.
Recent polls indicate a surge in support for Putin’s reelection, rising from 33% in 2019 to more than 70% in 2024. However, this 70% outwardly expressing general approval masks an underlying disconnect between citizens' wishes and Putin's actions. Qualitative insights show that many Russians in fact disagree with key policies such as further military mobilization and prioritizing foreign conflicts over domestic social problems. For better granularity, we created three groups based on several parameters, ranging from those whose support is mostly symbolic to “true believers."
Loyalists (25%): Supporters who approve of Putin, voted for him, and believe in his leadership, yet a significant portion want peace with Ukraine.
Pragmatists (20%): Critical supporters who see Putin as fallible and primarily use alternative media like YouTube or Telegram for information.
Putin's "Foot Soldiers" (20%): The most radical supporters advocating for further mobilization and higher military spending, aligning closely with Putin's strategic goals.
The study reveals a paradox: Many who publicly support Putin do not favour his actions or policies. For example, a majority of supporters favour a peace deal with Ukraine, while Putin's rhetoric emphasizes continued conflict. Furthermore, the ritualistic nature of voting in Russia reflects social expectations rather than a genuine belief in democratic processes or the effectiveness of the country’s leadership.
The analysis concludes that the apparent widespread support for Putin is superficial and influenced by the absence of political alternatives, propaganda-driven reflexes, and a deeply rooted sense of political apathy. Putin is viewed less as an active leader and more as a paternalistic symbol onto whom responsibility can be shifted, especially in times of crisis.
The Evolution of Putin’s Ratings Recently
Ahead of the 2024 presidential election, surveys from various Russian pollsters, including FOM, VTsIOM, and Levada Center, indicate a surge in support for Vladimir Putin's reelection, with 70% of respondents in favor, compared to just 33% in 2019. Trust in Putin is reportedly high, with VTsIOM finding 80.9% of respondents expressing confidence in the president and Levada showing a peak approval rating of 85%.
However, research by ExtremeScan and the "Chronicles of Attitudes Toward War” project suggests that such approval ratings are superficial and may not indicate true support, as the responses are shaped by limited question framing and propaganda. A key challenge in analyzing support for Vladimir Putin is indeed the superficiality of traditional approval metrics. Standard polling data often fail to capture the underlying motivations, inconsistencies, and symbolic nature of support for Putin. To make the data truly actionable for policy purposes, it is crucial to conduct a deeper qualitative analysis that goes beyond surface-level approval.
The Challenge of Measuring Russians' Attitudes Toward Vladimir Putin
The challenge of measuring the Russian public’s attitudes toward Vladimir Putin lies in the irrational disconnect between declared support and evaluations of his effectiveness as president. Putin is perceived by the masses not as a person or politician but as an irreplaceable and immutable symbol of state power in Russia, beyond any feedback mechanism.
People are experiencing a crisis of representation, with their interests unrepresented at the top. Not only is feedback absent, but even the intention to establish it is punishable. Practical discontent is permissible in everyday, non-public communication as long as it is not directed at Putin. We observe a paradoxical situation: people support Putin even if they disagree with his actions. This may mean that support for the national leader does not necessarily imply genuine loyalty.
Approval of Vladimir Putin's Performance
In September 2024, we repeated the traditional polling questions regarding approval of Putin's performance and voting in the presidential election. In response to the question "Do you generally approve or disapprove of Vladimir Putin's performance as president of Russia?" we obtained a figure close to those from the three major pollsters: 77% answered affirmatively. But what does this approval mean?
For all 2.5 years of the war, we have measured support for it and demonstrated that the direct response “I support special military operation” does not imply a readiness to continue the war, spend an enormous portion of the budget on the military, lose soldiers, conquer and retain occupied territories, and isolate from the West. Similarly, approval of “Putin’s performance” does not mean his decisions and actions align with his supporters’ wishes. A more reliable indicator of support for the sitting president is likely voting for him in elections—a real, physical action.
Voting for Vladimir Putin in the March 2024 Election
In September, we repeated the question from our research conducted during voting in March 2024: “Who did you vote for in the 2024 presidential election?” In the September survey, 54% of voters voted for Putin. This proportion does not differ from the figures we obtained and those from VTsIOM and FOM immediately after the election.
It is worth noting that almost no one believes in elections as a democratic tool for positively changing the country. Even Putin’s supporters do not associate their ritualistic action of socially approved voting for Putin with real consequences for the country. We understand that part of the electorate is in solidarity with his actions and decisions, but for many of his nominal supporters, elections have long turned into an empty, formal, and controlled action. For many voters, it is easier to participate in the administrative ritual of voting than to justify refusing to do so.
However, there were also substantial motives behind voting. In preelection qualitative research, we saw a strong conviction that only Putin could end the war in Ukraine. Participants in focus groups conducted jointly by the Chronicles project, ExtremeScan, and the Public Sociology Laboratory spoke about this spontaneously. Even those respondents who disapprove of Putin agreed with this thesis. Another motive for voting for Putin was the fear of any changes: “Who else if not him” and “Changing the commander-in-chief during a war is very risky.”
Deciphering Putin's Ratings
No perfect question can reveal the true level of support for Putin. Direct questions are unreliable—not because respondents deliberately lie, but because propaganda has formed rhetorical reflexes around key issues. We based our approach on the simple logic that approval of the president's performance and having voted for him should indicate support for his actions and decisions. To untangle Putin's ratings, we constructed several target groups of the president's supporters—from the broadest to the most engaged.
Approvers - 77%
The first, broadest group, 77% of the sample, consisted of respondents who answered affirmatively to the direct question about approval of Putin's performance. As all the other data show, this figure cannot be taken as a serious indicator of loyalty in principle. Within this group, we identified the following characteristics:
75% do not want mobilization to be conducted;
83% would like the authorities to prioritize internal social and economic problems;
51% (versus 17%) believe liberating Kursk Region is more important than gaining ground in the Donbas.
Putin does avoid mobilization out of fear of potential protests, sabotage, and a drop in his ratings. For him, domestic issues have always been less of a priority than external ones, and now even more so. He has focused on advancing in Ukraine rather than liberating Kursk Region.
Loyalists - 25%
A subgroup is the "loyalists,” who make up 25%. They:
Approve of Putin’s performance;
Voted for him in the 2024 presidential election;
Believe that Putin hardly makes mistakes in governing the country.
The loyalists are uncritical followers of Putin, but:
Almost half would prefer that peace be worked out with Ukraine next year “with mutual concessions”;
76% would like the authorities to prioritize internal social and economic issues;
43% are more inclined to stop the war rather than conduct a new mobilization;
In hypothetical peace negotiations, 47% would be satisfied with Ukraine renouncing its NATO ambitions, while only 32% insisted on retaining control over occupied territories.
Pragmatists - 20%
This subgroup consists of informed and critical supporters who:
Approve of Putin’s performance;
Voted for him in the 2024 election;
However, they believe that Putin could make mistakes in governing the country;
Use YouTube and/or Telegram as sources of information.
Compared with uncritical loyalists, pragmatists have a higher share of those who prefer a greater focus on internal problems (89%) and peace with Ukraine with mutual concessions (57%); there are also more opponents of mobilization (82%), though there is simultaneously a higher awareness of its necessity (48%).
Pragmatists are slightly more likely than loyalists to choose to gain ground in the Donbas at the expense of defending Russian territory (21% versus 16–17%), but 44% still would choose to liberate Kursk Region. They have a higher share of relatives fighting on the front line (36% compared to 29% among other Putin supporters), which adds a sense of reality to their perception of the war. They also have twice the proportion of private business owners, which somewhat qualifies their level of awareness and conscientiousness.
Putin’s “Foot Soldiers” - 20%
There is also a radical subgroup of Russians who to the most significant extent share Putin's ambitions. These real supporters:
Approve of Putin’s performance;
Prefer to continue the special military operation through mobilization rather than transitioning to peace negotiations;
Prioritize budget spending on the war rather than on social policy.
In other words, these individuals’ preferences align with Putin’s strategy and actions, which target military success in Ukraine.
91% of the "foot soldiers" support the special military operation;
83% of their closest circle of family and friends supports the special military operation (compared to 50% across the entire sample);
75% would not support a hypothetical decision by Putin to withdraw troops from Ukraine and move to peace negotiations—if goals are unachieved;
44% consider it fair to grant amnesty for criminal offenses in exchange for fighting in Ukraine, and 99% support benefits for soldiers.
In this group, men constitute 67%. Among them, 33% have a family member fighting in Ukraine (versus 27% in the general population), and 5% claim to be veterans of the special military operation themselves (compared to 2% across the entire sample). They appear to be true, militaristic Putin loyalists. By profile, they correspond to the new middle class, composed mainly of Ukraine veterans and workers in the sectors with the most import substitution. Yet even these individuals often appear dovish through the lens of their expectations.
Desired Events in the Coming Year
73% would like the authorities to prioritize internal social and economic issues.
33% would prefer a peace treaty with Ukraine with mutual concessions.
53% would like Western sanctions to be lifted.
42% would like relations with the West to be restored.
And what is more important to them—advancing in Ukraine or liberating Kursk Region? Forty-two percent versus 29% say their homeland is more important than the so-called “new territories.” These aspirations do not align with Putin's actions. Kursk Region and domestic problems are not his priority, and he has written off any prospects for restoring relations with the West. If Putin’s supporters are filtered by dissent from his actions and policies, their ranks noticeably dwindle.
Perception of the War by Putin’s Supporters
Across most parameters, many of Putin’s supporters disagree with his policies on these issues.
On the one hand, this is normal—a leader's views cannot completely match those of his supporters. On the other hand, decisions are of the utmost importance for the country and the ordinary person—crucial for the leader and life-changing for people. In Putin’s case, these are the decisions to start and end the war. The beginning of the war came as an absolute shock to the entire country, while its end has become the demand of an increasing share (now 80%) of the population.
One-Third of Putin Supporters Are Not Ready to Endorse the Special Military Operation
Despite the apparent social norm to support the war, one-third of Putin supporters are unwilling to do so. Furthermore, when asked about ending the war, even more are willing to "support the decision to withdraw troops and transition to peace negotiations, even if the goals of the special operation are unachieved." This is happening despite Putin's aggressive goals, who stated "The outcome must favour Russia, I say directly, without any hesitation, and must be based on the realities unfolding on the battlefield. Without any doubt, there will be no concessions or compromises."
From 48% to 59% of Putin supporters across our model groups are ready to support a peace treaty with Ukraine with mutual concessions. Notably, these figures are not radically different from the entire sample, where 63% want peace with mutual concessions. The questions about ending the war are becoming increasingly relevant because "support for the war" increasingly fails to reflect actual attitudes toward it, just as approval of Vladimir Putin's performance does not reflect the alignment of his actions with the people's stated interests. Russians are constantly thinking about an end to the war, not about victories by the Russian army. Therefore, attitudes toward peace, troop withdrawal, terms for a truce, compromises, and a vision of a postwar future are more consciously formed among people than approval or disapproval of the "special military operation."
Discrepancy Between Putin Voters’ Wishes and Reality of His Presidency
Just as support for the special military operation appears to be an abstraction, so is the attitude toward Putin. Using standard question formulations, pollsters obtain large but empty numbers. Projective techniques work better. For instance, the question "Does this politician reflect the interests (expectations) of people like you?" allows for modelling the actual alignment between the leader and his subjects. In our studies, conducted before the March presidential election at the end of January 2024 and after in September 2024, we asked two questions about significant events.
The first:
● What events from the list would you like to see happen in the coming year? (The same question in both surveys).
And the second question in two versions (before and after the election):
● Version at the end of January 2024, before the election:
○ "If Vladimir Putin wins the Russian presidential election, what events, in your opinion, will occur in the coming year?"
● Version in September 2024, after the election:
○ "What events do you think will occur in the coming year?"
Among Putin's voters, a noticeable discrepancy emerges between the desired events and the actions they expect from their "chosen one." People know that Putin’s presidency will lead to negative consequences and undesirable events. But at the same time, they are removed from the rational sphere. Their choice is driven not by preferences but by the perceived absence of alternatives and learned disbelief in the possibility of changing power.
For example, the desire for mobilization (or rather the recognition of its necessity) grew over the eight months from 17% to 27%, and correspondingly, the expectation (prediction) that it would happen also increased. For positive events, we see the opposite trend. The desire for such events significantly exceeds expectations: a peace treaty with Ukraine with mutual concessions at 55% and 35%, respectively, and a focus on internal issues at 82% and 60%.
This significant discrepancy raises how someone can vote for a candidate who will not fulfill their wishes. The answer, apparently, is that wishes are one reality, while actual policy is another. Putin's voters do not view him as a leader who addresses people's problems.
A Normal Presidential Candidate
And here is what the map of wishes and expectations (predictions) looked like for the hypothetical presidency of Boris Nadezhdin. The questions were asked during electoral monitoring before his presidential campaign was cut short: “Which of the listed events would you like to see happen in the coming year?”—“If Boris Nadezhdin won the Russian presidential election, which of the listed events, in your opinion, would occur in the coming year?” The response for a real candidate is clear—people want a candidate who aligns with their wishes, expecting their candidate to fulfil them: "My president is the one who will do what matters to people like me."
A comparison o leaves no doubt about the radically different expectations of the presidencies of two candidates with inherently different support bases. Nadezhdin entered the public space on a wave of antiwar sentiment because his rhetoric (and possibly real intentions) aligned with voters' wishes. A small expectation discrepancy appeared only regarding lifting sanctions and restoring relations with the West. According to his electorate, one year might not be enough for these changes.
‘If Not Putin, Then Who?’ Looking at a Hypothetical Alternative President
Since no realistic presidential candidates were expected, we focused during the preelection qualitative study on the question of what kind of alternative Putin people would support. A joint study in focus groups was conducted in November 2023 in four major Russian cities by the Chronicles project, ExtremeScan, and the Public Sociology Laboratory. Participants were indifferent to the upcoming presidential election, four months away, and disillusioned with the country’s unchanging leader. At that point, we invited them to formulate the characteristics of an alternative candidate they would vote for.
Here are the characteristics spontaneously formulated by our respondents:
This should be a leader with a pro-Western orientation who minimizes relations with rogue states, those not accepted in the Western world.
He must have a clear plan for the country's development—a simple, understandable model of progress for Russia. This model should emphasize addressing the internal needs of the population. Domestic economic policy should take priority over foreign policy.
The candidate must possess personnel competence and the ability to attract smart and capable individuals to his circle rather than those merely loyal to him personally.
The candidate's team, deserving of public support, should be formed based on professional suitability, experience, knowledge, and achievements in their field.
He should be socially oriented, focused on helping citizens, providing social benefits, and striving to raise the electorate's material standard of living.
A candidate who supports federalization, prioritizes regional interests, and emphasises development at the level of the country’s regions, not just in the capital cities, would attract significant interest.
He wants peace, is averse to war, avoids jingoistic rhetoric, does not rely on military power, and seeks peaceful solutions to conflicts.
This "nonexistent ideal candidate" must support political competition and be a guarantor of it.
The audience was ready to support a candidate who tells the truth, even unpleasant. He does not base his program on unachievable promises.
Only one characteristic corresponds somewhat to Putin’s rhetoric: "The president should embody a nationalist idea." This wish came from the part of the audience that was concerned with the issue of “preserving Russians in their homeland.” Its essence concerns the president working in the Russian nation's interest. It is important to note that the image of the “ideal president” created during the focus groups was relatively consistent among both Putin supporters and opponents.
The Glue Binding Putin and His Supporters
The irrational behaviour of Putin's supporters means that direct questions about attitudes toward Putin do not reflect the people's actual acceptance, support, or recognition of him. The aggregate figure of support that researchers receive is the result of genuine support for him (25-30%), social norms (the majority), partial fear of not “supporting the national leader during wartime,” and the absence of an alternative political landscape, with a small multiplier for censorship and propaganda. However, this does not mean that Putin's support is ephemeral and can easily be reduced if people knew the discrepancies between their wishes and Putin's actions.
At the beginning of the war, we hypothesized that high support for the special military operation was at least partly due to a lack of information about actual events in Ukraine. If people learned of the suffering of Ukrainians, they would turn away from the special military operation and look more critically at the authorities. Information restrictions do affect attitudes toward the special military operation, but our hypothesis was not confirmed. Even the brutal footage from Bucha was successfully presented by propaganda as a staged effort by Ukrainian propagandists. One respondent said in the focus groups: “No one needs the truth.”
We see that education (and therefore greater awareness) has little impact on the level of support for the special military operation, meaning that support for the war among those with higher education is the same as in the sample as a whole. It is important to note that the share of open dissent is higher among people with higher education than the general population. The more affluent the Russians, the more likely they are to support the special military operation
This correlation was surprising for researchers. We have seen a shift in the previously more oppositional political profile of Moscow residents (many of whom are government workers) to resemble nationwide support figures for the special military operation. If people’s material conditions have improved in recent years, they typically demonstrate higher support for the war—58% (compared to 44% among those whose conditions have worsened).
Our Entire Experience of Studying Attitudes Toward the Special Military Operation Shows the Importance of Not Falling into Consciousness Traps
While approval for Putin is a simulacrum and needs to be decoded, the “new” disapproval of the war, negative attitudes toward mobilization, and desire for peace (simple, without conditions or costs) among a significant part of the population are not motivated by moral rejection of the war but by people’s fears and unwillingness to lose a peaceful, prosperous life. Presumably, this is why there is no sharp dissonance between Putin’s actions and decisions and individuals’ wishes.
The authorities have long worked to atomize society, replacing human values with those needed for war: the glorification of combat and soldiers, traditionalism, and a readiness for isolation from the world, state control over private life, and the hunting down of any dissenters. On a personal level, this results in the destruction of empathy, a lack of civic unity, and the desire to distance oneself from others’ problems. For two and a half years, few in Russia noticed that there were bombings and people were dying on Russian territory. Studies in the border areas showed that residents’ support for the special military operation only decreases when someone close to them is attacked, injured, or killed, or when the family income decreases or life-saving medications become unavailable.
Moral Questions About Putin Are Relevant Only to the Reflective, Opposition Minority
For most of the population, concerns about “brotherly” Ukraine do not matter, and at the same time, they have become less sensitive to the consequences of Putin's decisions for Russia. As a result, Putin's rating is an abstract, Teflon-coated reality.
For Russians, Putin is not a living authority figure but a paternalistic symbol, someone on whom responsibility can be offloaded in situations of personal helplessness: “They know better up there,” “Putin started the war, let him end it,” “Who else if not him…” Over the past 24 years, Putin's approval ratings have dropped during economic discontent and risen during patriotic euphoria. Still, overall, they have remained relatively robust even to dramatic events.
After the 2022 mobilization, Prigozhin’s mutiny, Navalny’s death (according to ExtremeScan, right after this, Putin's support dropped by five percentage points and stayed there until the election), and the Kursk incursion, pollsters indicate a reduction in trust in Putin, his approval rating, and other indicators of only 5-6 percentage points.
Putin’s ratings, according to what Russians tell pollsters, behave like a parallel reality and mean very little. People in Russia are accustomed to living with distrust in authorities, elections, and politicians. Political apathy among Russians (“I don’t deal with politics,” “vote or don’t vote, you’ll get…”) leads not only to a reluctance to think and be active but also to Putin's supporters being indifferent to him. So, the relationship between Putin and his people is entirely mutual.
Conclusion
An analysis of Vladimir Putin's approval ratings reveals a complex picture of public sentiment in Russia. While traditional polling suggests widespread support, a deeper dive uncovers significant contradictions and a lack of genuine alignment between Putin's actions and the wishes of his supporters. Many Russians express approval of Putin not out of loyalty or agreement with his policies but rather due to a sense of political apathy, a belief in the lack of alternatives, and the symbolic role Putin plays as a representation of state power. To develop effective policies that genuinely resonate with the Russian public, it is essential to move beyond superficial polling data and undertake qualitative analyses that capture the motivations, concerns, and contradictions that underpin public attitudes. Only by understanding these more profound layers of support can policymakers craft meaningful interventions that address the root causes of approval and discontent, ultimately leading to a more informed approach to Russia's political landscape.
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